Voting rules allow multiple agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint decisions. Perhaps one of the most important desirable properties in this context is Condorcet-consistency, which requires that a voting rule should return an alternative that is preferred to any other alternative by some majority of voters. Another desirable property is participation, which requires that no voter should be worse off by joining an electorate. A seminal result in social choice theory by Moulin [28] has shown that Condorcetconsistency and participation are incompatible whenever there are at least 4 alternatives and 25 voters. We leverage SAT solving to obtain an elegant human-readable proof of Moulin's result that requires only 12 voters. Moreover, the SAT solver is able to construct a Condorcet-consistent voting rule that satisfies participation as well as a number of other desirable properties for up to 11 voters, proving the optimality of the above bound. We also obtain tight results for set-valued and probabilistic voting rules, which complement and significantly improve existing theorems.
INTRODUCTION
Whenever a group of autonomous software agents or robots needs to decide on a joint course of action in a fair and satisfactory way, they need to aggregate their preferences. A common way to achieve this is to use voting rules. Voting rules are studied in detail in social choice theory and are coming under increasing scrutiny from computer scientists who are interested in their computational properties or want to utilize them in multiagent systems (see, e.g., [31, 9] ).
In social choice theory, voting rules are usually compared using desirable properties (so-called axioms) that they may or may not satisfy. There are a number of well-known impossibility theorems-among which Arrow's impossibility is arguably the most famous-which state that certain axioms are incompatible with each other. These results, which show the non-existence of voting rules that satisfy a given set May 9-13, 2016, Singapore. of axioms, are important because they clearly define the boundary of what can be achieved at all. This applies to the explicitly stated axioms as well as implicit ones such as boundaries on the number of voters or alternatives. For instance, if there are only two alternatives, Arrow's theorem does not apply and there are many voting rules, including majority rule, that satisfy the conditions used in Arrow's theorem. One impossibility that requires unusually high bounds on the number of voters and alternatives is Moulin's no-show paradox [28] , which states that the axioms of Condorcet-consistency and participation are incompatible whenever there are at least 4 alternatives and 25 voters. Moulin proves that the bound on the number of alternatives is tight by showing that the maximin voting rule (with lexicographic tie-breaking) satisfies the desired properties when there are at most 3 alternatives. The tightness of the more restrictive condition on the number of voters was left open, however. The goal of this paper is to give tight bounds on the number of voters required for Moulin's theorem and related theorems that appear in the literature. To achieve this, we encode these problems as formulas in propositional logic and then use SAT solvers to decide their satisfiability and extract minimal unsatisfiable sets (MUSes) in the case of unsatisfiability. This approach is based on previous work by Tang and Lin [35] , Geist and Endriss [20] , Brandt and Geist [8] , and Brandl et al. [4] . However, it turned out that a straightforward application of this methodology is insufficient to deal with the magnitude of the problems we considered. Several novel techniques were necessary to achieve our results. In particular, we extracted knowledge from computer-generated proofs of weaker statements and then used this information to guide the search for proofs of more general statements.
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As mentioned above, Moulin's theorem uses the axioms of Condorcet-consistency and participation. Condorcetconsistency goes back to one of the most influential notions in social choice theory, namely that of a Condorcet winner. A Condorcet winner is an alternative that is preferred to any other alternative by a majority of voters. The Marquis de Condorcet, after whom this concept is named, argued that, whenever a Condorcet winner exists, it should be elected [15] . A voting rule satisfying this condition is called Condorcet-consistent. Apart from the intuitive appeal of this condition, Condorcet-consistent rules are more robust to changes in the of feasible alternatives and less susceptible to strategic manipulation than other voting rules (such as Borda's rule) (see, e.g., [11, 14] ). While the desirability of Condorcet-consistency-as that of any other axiom-has been subject to criticism, many scholars agree that it is very appealing-if not indispensable-and a large part of the social choice literature deals exclusively with Condorcetconsistent voting rules (e.g., [17, 25, 9] ). Participation was first considered by Fishburn and Brams [18] and requires that no voter should be worse off by joining an electorate, or-alternatively-that no voter should benefit by abstaining from an election. The desirability of this axiom in any context with voluntary participation is evident. All the more surprisingly, Fishburn and Brams have shown that single transferable vote (STV), a common voting rule, violates participation and referred to this phenomenon as the no-show paradox. Moulin [28] , perhaps even more startlingly, proved that no Condorcet-consistent voting rule satisfies participation when there are at least 25 voters.
We leverage SAT solving to obtain an elegant humanreadable proof of Moulin's result that requires only 12 voters. While computer-aided solving techniques allow us to tackle difficult combinatorial problems, they usually do not provide additional insight into these problems. Somewhat surprisingly, the computer-aided proofs we found possess a certain kind of symmetry that has not been exploited in previous proofs. Moreover, the SAT solver is able to construct a Condorcet-consistent voting rule that satisfies participation as well as a number of other desirable properties for up to 11 voters, proving the optimality of the above bound. This computer-generated voting rule is compatible with the maximin voting rule in 99.8% of all cases and, in contrast to maximin, only selects alternatives from the top cycle. As a practical consequence of our theorem, strategic abstention need not be a concern for Condorcet-consistent voting rules when there are at most 4 alternatives and 11 voters, for instance when voting in a committee. We also use our techniques to provide optimal bounds for related results about set-valued and probabilistic voting rules [22, 36] . In particular, we give a tight bound of 17 voters for the optimistic preference extension, 14 voters for the pessimistic extension, and 12 voters for the stochastic dominance preference extension. These results are substantial improvements of previous results. For example, the previous statement for the pessimistic extension requires an additional axiom, at least 5 alternatives, and at least 971 voters [22] . Our results are summarized in Table 1 .
RELATED WORK
The no-show paradox was first observed by Fishburn and Brams [18] for the STV voting rule. Ray [30] and Lepelley and Merlin [26] investigate how frequently this phenomenon occurs in practice. The main theorem addressed in this paper is due to Moulin [28] and requires at least 25 voters. This bound was recently brought down to 21 voters by Kardel [23] . Simplified proofs of Moulin's theorem are given by Schulze [33] and Smith [34] . Holzman [21] and Sanver and Zwicker [32] strengthen Moulin's theorem by weakening Condorcet-consistency and participation, respectively. Jimeno et al. [22] prove variants of Moulin's theorem for set-valued voting rules based on the optimistic and the pessimistic preference extension. Pérez [29] defines a weaker notion of participation in the context of set-valued voting rules and shows that all common Condorcet extensions except the maximin rule and Young's rule violate this property. Pérez notes that "a practical question, which has not been dealt with here, refers to the number of candidates and voters that are necessary to invoke the studied paradoxes" ( [29] , p. 614).
When assuming that voters have incomplete preferences over sets or lotteries, participation and Condorcetconsistency can be satisfies simultaneously and positive results for common Condorcet-consistent voting rules have been obtained by Brandt [7] and Brandl et al. [4, 5, 6] . Abstention in slightly different contexts than the one studied in this paper recently caught the attention of computer scientists working on voting equilibria and campaigning [16, 1] .
The computer-aided techniques in this paper are inspired by Tang and Lin [35] , who reduced well-known impossibility results from social choice theory-such as Arrow's theorem-to finite instances, which can then be checked by a SAT solver. This methodology has been extended and applied to new problems by Geist and Endriss [20] , Brandt and Geist [8] , and Brandl et al. [4] . The results obtained by computer-aided theorem proving have already found attention in the social choice community [12] . More generally, SAT solvers have also proven to be quite effective for other problems in economics. A prominent example is the ongoing work by Fréchette et al. [19] in which SAT solvers are used for the development and execution of the FCC's upcoming reverse spectrum auction. In some respects, our approach also bears some similarities to automated mechanism design (see, e.g., [13] ), where desirable properties are encoded and mechanisms are computed to fit specific problem instances.
PRELIMINARIES
Let A be a set of m alternatives and N be a set of n voters. Whether no-show paradoxes occur depends on the exact values of m and n. By E(N ) := 2 N \{∅} we denote the set of electorates, i.e., non-empty subsets of N . For many of our results, we will take A = {a, b, c, d}, and we use the labels x, y for arbitrary elements of A.
A (strict) preference relation is a complete, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation on A. The preference relation of voter i is denoted by i. The set of all preference relations over A is denoted by R. For brevity, we denote by abcd the preference relation a i b i c i d, eliding the identity of voter i, and similarly for other preferences.
A preference profile R is a function from an electorate N ∈ E(N ) to the set of preference relations R. The set of all preference profiles is thus given by R E(N ) . For the sake of adding and deleting voters, we define for any preference profile R ∈ R N with (i, i) ∈ R, and j ∈ N \ N , j ∈ R
If the identity of the voter is clear or irrelevant we sometimes, in slight abuse of notation, refer to R − i by R − i, and write R + j instead of R + (j, j ). If k voters with the same preferences i are to be added or removed, we write R + k · i and R − k · i, respectively. The majority margin of R is the map gR : A × A → Z with gR(x, y) = |{i ∈ N | x i y}| − |{i ∈ N | y i x}|. The majority margin can be viewed as the adjacency matrix of a weighted tournament TR. We say that a preference profile R induces the weighted tournament TR.
An alternative x is called Condorcet winner if it wins against any other alternative in a majority contest, i.e., if gR(x, y) > 0 for all y ∈ A \ {x}. Conversely, an alternative x is a Condorcet loser if gR(x, y) < 0 for all y ∈ A \ {x}. Possibility Impossibility Our central object of study are voting rules, i.e., functions that assigns every preference profile a socially preferred alternative. Thus, a voting rule is a function f : R E(N ) → A. In this paper, we study voting rules that satisfy Condorcet-consistency and participation.
Definition 1. A Condorcet extension is a voting rule that selects the Condorcet winner whenever it exists. Thus, f is a Condorcet extension if for every preference profile R that admits a
Condorcet winner x, we have f (R) = x. We say that f is Condorcet-consistent.
Definition 2. A voting rule f satisfies participation if all voters always weakly prefer voting to not voting, i.e., if
Equivalently, participation requires that for all preference profiles R not including voter j, we have f (R+ j ) j f (R).
MAXIMIN AND KEMENY'S RULE
The proofs of both positive and negative results to come were obtained through automated techniques that we describe in Section 5. To become familiar with the kind of arguments produced in this way, we will now study a more restricted setting which is of independent interest. Specifically, let us consider voting rules that select winners in accordance with the popular maximin and Kemeny rules. For a preference profile R, an alternative x is a maximin winner if it maximizes min y∈A\{x} gR(x, y); thus, x never gets defeated too badly in pairwise comparisons. An alternative x is a Kemeny winner if it is ranked first in some Kemeny ranking. A Kemeny ranking is a preference relation K ∈ R maximizing agreement with voters' individual preferences, i.e., it maximizes the quantity
We call a voting rule a maximin extension (resp. Kemeny extension) if it always selects a maximin winner (resp. Kemeny winner). Since a Condorcet winner, if it exists, is always the unique maximin and Kemeny winner of a preference profile, any such voting rule is also a Condorcet extension. We can now prove an easy version of Moulin's theorem for these more restricted voting rules.
To this end, we first prove a useful lemma allowing us to extend impossibility proofs for 4 alternatives to also apply if there are more than 4 alternatives. Its proof gives a first hint on how Condorcet-consistency and participation interact.
Lemma 1. Suppose that f is a Condorcet extension satisfying participation. Let R be a preference profile and B A a set of bad alternatives such that each voter ranks every
Proof. By induction on the number of voters |N | in R. If R consists of a single voter i, then, since f is a Condorcet extension, f (R) must return i's top choice, which is not bad. If R consists of at least 2 voters, and i ∈ N , then by partic-
were bad, then so would be f (R − i), contradicting the inductive hypothesis.
The following computer-aided proofs, just like the more complicated proofs to follow, can be understood solely by carefully examining the corresponding 'proof diagram'. An arrow such as R R + abcd indicates that profile R is obtained from R by adding a voter abcd, and is read as "if one of the bold green alternatives (here ab) is selected at R, then one of them is selected at R " (by participation). A circled node a indicates a profile admitting Condorcet winner a, although in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, we use it to refer to maximin and Kemeny winners, respectively. Proof. Let f be a maximin extension which satisfies participation. Consider the following 6-voter profile R:
Suppose f (R) ∈ {a, b}. Adding an abcd vote leads to a weighted tournament in which alternative c is the unique maximin winner. But this contradicts participation since the added voter would benefit from abstaining the election.
Symmetrically, if f (R) ∈ {c, d}, then adding a dcba vote leads to a weighted tournament in which b is the maximin winner, again contradicting participation. The symmetry of the argument is due to an automorphism of R, namely the relabelling of alternatives according to abcd → dcba.
If m > 4, we add new bad alternatives x1, x2, . . . , xm−4 to the bottom of R and of the additional voters. By Lemma 1, f chooses from {a, b, c, d} at each step, completing the proof.
The existence result for n 6 is established by the methods described in Section 5.
For 3 alternatives, Moulin [28] proved that the voting rule that chooses the lexicographically first maximin winner satisfies participation. Theorem 1 shows that this is not the case for 4 alternatives, even if there are only 7 voters and no matter how we pick among maximin winners. Proof. Let f be a Kemeny extension which satisfies participation. Consider the following 4-voter profile R:
Suppose f (R) = d. Then removing cbad from R yields a weighted tournament in which a is the (unique) Kemeny winner, which contradicts participation. Analogously, we can exclude the other three possible outcomes for R by letting a voter abstain, which always leads to a unique Kemeny winner and a contradiction with participation. The arguments are identical because R is completely symmetric in the sense that for any pair of alternatives x and y, there is an automorphism of R that maps x to y.
Just like for Theorem 1, if m > 4, we add new bad alternatives x1, x2, . . . , xm−4 to the bottom of R and of the additional voters. By Lemma 1, f chooses from {a, b, c, d} at each step, completing the proof.
One remarkable and unexpected aspect of the computeraided proofs above is that their simplicity is due to automorphisms of the underlying preference profiles. Similar automorphisms will also be used in the proofs of the stronger theorems in Sections 6, 7, and 8. We emphasize that these symmetries are not hard-coded into our problem specification and, to the best of our knowledge, have not been exploited in previous proofs of similar statements.
METHOD: SAT SOLVING FOR COMPUTER-AIDED PROOFS
The bounds in this paper were obtained with the aid of a computer. In this section, we describe the method that we employed. The main tool in our approach is an encoding of our problems into propositional logic. We then use SAT solvers to decide whether (in a chosen setting) there exists a Condorcet extension satisfying participation. If the answer is yes, the solver returns an explicit such voting rule. If the answer is no, we use a process called MUS extraction to find a short certificate of this fact which can be translated into a human-readable proof. By successively proving stronger theorems and using the insights obtained through MUS extraction, we arrived at results as presented in their full generality in this paper.
SAT Encoding
"For n voters and 4 alternatives, is there a voting rule f that satisfies Condorcet-consistency and participation?" A natural encoding of this question into propositional logic proceeds like this: Generate all profiles over 4 alternatives with at most n voters. For each such profile R, introduce 4 propositional variables xR,a, xR,b, xR,c, xR,d , where the intended meaning of xR,a is xR,a is set true ⇐⇒ f (R) = a.
We then add clauses requiring that for each profile R, f (R) takes exactly one value, and we add clauses requiring f to be Condorcet-consistent and satisfy participation.
Sadly, the encoding sketched above is not tractable for the values of n that we are interested in: the number of variables and clauses used grows as Θ(24 n ), because there are 4! = 24 possible preference relations over 4 alternatives and thus 24 n profiles with n voters. For n = 7, this leads to more than 400 billion variables, and for n = 15 we exceed 10 22 variables. To escape this combinatorial explosion, we will temporarily restrict our attention to pairwise voting rules. This means that we assign an outcome alternative f (T ) to every weighted tournament T . We then define a voting rule that assigns the outcome f (TR) to each preference profile R, where TR is the weighted tournament induced by R.
The number of tournaments induced by profiles with n voters grows much slower than the number of profiles-our computer enumeration suggests a growth of order about 1.5 n . This much more manageable (yet still exponential) growth allows us to consider problem instances up to n ≈ 16 which turns out to be just enough.
Other than referring to (weighted) tournaments instead of profiles, our encoding into logic now proceeds exactly like before. Since we are interested in voting rules that satisfy participation, we also need to encode this property. To this end, let T = TR be a tournament induced by R and let be a preference relation. Define T + := T R+ . (The tournament T + is independent of the choice of R.) We define
Requiring f to be Condorcet-consistent is straightforward: if tournament T admits b as the Condorcet winner, we add condorcetT := ¬xT,a ∧ xT,b ∧ ¬xT,c ∧ ¬xT,d, and we add similar formulas for each tournament that admits a Condorcet winner. Then the models of the conjunction of all the non-empty, mutex, participation, and condorcet formulas are precisely the pairwise voting rules satisfying Condorcet-consistency and participation.
By adapting the condorcet formulas, we can impose more stringent conditions on f -this is how our results for maximin and Kemeny extensions are obtained. We can also use this to exclude Pareto-dominated alternatives, and to require f to always pick from the top cycle.
For some purposes it will be useful not to include the mutex clauses in our final formula. Models of this formula then correspond to set-valued voting rules that satisfy participation interpreted according to the optimistic preference extension. See Section 7 for results in this setting.
SAT Solving and MUS Extraction
The formulas we have obtained above are all given in conjunctive normal form (CNF), and thus can be evaluated without further transformations by any off-the-shelf SAT solver. In order to physically produce a CNF formula as described, we employ a straightforward Python script that performs a breadth-first search to discover all weighted tournaments with up to n voters (see Algorithm 1 for a schematic overview of the program). The script outputs a CNF formula in the standard DIMACS format, and also outputs a file that, for each variable xT,x, records the tournament T and alternative x it denotes. This is necessary because the DIMACS format uses uninformative variable descriptors (consecutive integers) and memorizing variable meanings allows us to interpret the output of the SAT solver.
Algorithm 1 Generate formula for up to n voters
T0 ← {weighted tournament on {a, b, c, d} with all edges having weight 0}.
As an example, the output formula for n = 15 in DI-MACS format has a size of about 7 GB and uses 50 million variables and 2 billion clauses, taking 6.5 hours to write. Plingeling [3] , a popular SAT solver that we used for all results in this paper, solves this formula in 50 minutes of wall clock time, half of which is spent parsing the formula.
In case a given instance is satisfiable, the solver returns a satisfying assignment, giving us an existence proof and a concrete example for a voting rule satisfying participation (and any further requirements imposed). In case a given instance in unsatisfiable, we would like to have short certificate of this fact as well. One possibility for this is having the SAT solver output a resolution proof (in DRUP format, say). This yields a machine-checkable proof, but has two major drawbacks: the generated proofs can be uncomfortably large [24] , and they do not give human-readable insights about why the formula is unsatisfiable.
We handle this problem by computing a minimal unsatisfiable subset (MUS) of the unsatisfiable CNF formula. An MUS is a subset of the clauses of the original formula which itself is unsatisfiable, and is minimally so: removing any clause from it yields a satisfiable formula. We used the tools MUSer2 [2] and MARCO [27] to extract MUSes. If an unsatisfiable formula admits a very small MUS, it is often possible to obtain a human-readable proof of unsatisfiability from it [8, 4] .
Note that for purposes of extracting human-readable proofs, it is desirable for the MUS to be as small as possible, and also to refer to as few different tournaments as possible. The first issue can be addressed by running the MUS extractor repeatedly, instructing it to order clauses randomly (note that clause sets of different cardinalities can be minimally unsatisfiable with respect to set inclusion); similarly, we can use MARCO to enumerate all MUSes and look for small ones. The second issue can be addressed by computing a group MUS: here, we partition the clauses of the CNF formula into groups, and we are looking for a minimal set of groups that together are unsatisfiable. In our case, the clauses referring to a given tournament T form a group. In practice, finding a group MUS first and then finding a standard (clause-level) MUS within the group MUS yielded sets of size much smaller than MUSes returned without the intermediate group-step (often by a factor of 10).
To translate an MUS into a human-readable proof, we created another program that visualized the MUS in a convenient form.
1 Indeed, this program outputs the 'proof diagrams' like Figure 1 that appear throughout this paper (though we re-typeset them). We think that interpreting these diagrams is quite natural (and is perhaps even easier than reading a textual translation). More importantly, the automatically produced graphs allowed us to quickly judge the quality of an extracted MUS.
Incremental Proof Discovery
The SAT encoding described in Section 5.1 only concerns pairwise voting rules, yet none of the (negative) results in this paper require or use this assumption. This is the product of multiple rounds of generating and evaluating SAT formulas, extracting MUSes, and using the insights generated by this as 'educated guesses' to solve more general problems.
Following the process as described so far led to a proof that for 4 alternatives and 12 voters, there is no pairwise Condorcet extension that satisfies participation. That proof used the assumption of pairwiseness, i.e., it assumed that the voting rule returns the same alternative on profiles inducing the same weighted tournament. However, intriguingly, the preference profiles mentioned in the proof did not contain all 4! = 24 possible preference relations over {a, b, c, d}. In fact, it only used 10 of the possible orders. Further, each profile included R0 = {abdc, bdca, cabd, dcab} as a subprofile. As we argued at the start of Section 5.1, it is intractable to search over the entire space of preference profiles. On the other hand, it is much easier to merely search over all extensions of R0 that contain at most n = 12 voters and only contain copies of the 10 orders previously identified. The SAT formula produced by doing exactly this turned out to be unsatisfiable, and a small MUS extracted from it gave rise to Theorem 3.
The proof of Theorem 6 for 17 voters was obtained by running Algorithm 1 with T0 initialized to the weighted tournament induced by the initial profile R used in the proof of Theorem 3. Before finding this tournament, we tried various other tournaments as T0, including ones featuring in Moulin's original proof, and ones occurring at other steps in the proof of Theorem 3, but R turned out to give the best (and indeed a tight) bound, and additionally exhibits a lot of symmetry that was also present in the MUS we extracted.
MAIN RESULT
We are now in a position to state and prove our main claim that Condorcet extensions cannot avoid the no-show paradox for 12 or more voters (when there are at least 4 alternatives), and that this result is optimal.
Theorem 3. There is no Condorcet extension that satisfies participation for m 4 and n 12.
Proof. The proof follows the structure depicted in Figure 1 . Let R be the preference profile shown there.
Since R remains fixed after relabelling alternatives according to abcd → dcba, we may assume without loss of generality that f (R) ∈ {a, b}. (An explicit proof in case f (R) ∈ {c, d} is indicated in Figure 1. ) By participation, it follows from f (R) ∈ {a, b} that also f (Rα := R + 2 · abcd) ∈ {a, b} since the voters with preferences abcd cannot be worse off by joining the electorate. If f (Rα) = a, again by participation, removing 2 voters with preferences bdca does not change the winning alternative (so f (Rα − 2 · bdca) = a), and neither does adding acdb, so f (Rα − 2 · bdca + acdb) = a, which, however, is in conflict with Rα − 2 · bdca + acdb having a Condorcet winner, c.
Thus we must have f (Rα) = b, which implies that f (Rα − dcab) = b, and thus f (R β := Rα − dcab − 2 · cabd) ∈ {b, d}.
We again proceed by cases: If f (R β ) = b, we can add a voter badc to obtain a profile with Condorcet winner a, which contradicts participation. But then, if f (R β ) = d, we get that f (R β − abcd) = d and, by another application of participation, that f (R β − abcd + 3 · dcba) = d in contrast to the existence of Condorcet winner b, a contradiction.
If m > 4, we add bad alternatives x1, x2, . . . , xm−4 to the bottom of R and all other voters. By Lemma 1, f chooses from {a, b, c, d} at each step, completing the proof.
The following result establishes that our bound on the number of voters is tight. A very useful feature of our computer-aided approach is that we can easily add additional requirements for the desired voting rule. Two common requirements for voting rules are that they should only return alternatives that are Pareto-optimal and contained in the top cycle (also known as the Smith set) (see, e.g., [17] ). The Condorcet extension f is given as a look-up table, which is derived from the output of a SAT solver. The lookup table lists all 1, 204, 215 weighted tournaments inducible by up to 11 voters and assigns each an output alternative (see Figure 2 for an excerpt). The relevant text file has a size of 28 MB (gzipped 4.5 MB).
Comparing this voting rule with known voting rules, it turns out that it picks a maximin winner in 99.8% and a Kemeny winner in 98% of all weighted tournaments. Moreover, the rule agrees with the maximin rule with lexicographic tie-breaking on 95% of weighted tournaments. The similarity with the maximin rule is interesting insofar as a welldocumented flaw of the maximin rule is that it fails to be a refinement of the top cycle (and may even return Condorcet losers). Our computer-generated rule always picks from the top cycle while it remains very close to the maximin rule.
80% of the considered weighted tournaments admit a Condorcet winner, which uniquely determines the output of the rule; this can be used to reduce the size of the look-up table.
SET-VALUED VOTING RULES
A drawback of voting rules, as we defined them so far, is that that the requirement to always return a single winner is in conflict with basic fairness conditions, namely anonymity and neutrality. A large part of the social choice literature therefore deals with set-valued voting rules, where ties are usually assumed to be eventually broken by some tiebreaking mechanism.
A set-valued voting rule (sometimes known as a voting correspondence or as an irresolute voting rule) is a function F : R E(N ) → 2 A \ {∅} that assigns each preference profile R a non-empty set of alternatives. The function F is a (setvalued) Condorcet extension if for every preference profile R that admits a Condorcet winner x, we have F (R) = {x}.
Following the work of Pérez [29] and Jimeno et al. [22] , we seek to study the occurrence of the no-show paradox in a,#1,(1,1,1,1,1,1)  a,#1,(1,1,1,1,1,-1)  a,#1,(1,1,1,-1,1,1)  a,#1,(1,1,1,-1,-1,1)  a,#1,(1,1,1,1,-1,-1)  a,#1,(1,1,1,-1,-1,-1)  b,#1,(-1,1,1,1,1,1)  b,#1,(-1,1,1,1,1,-1)  b,#1,(-1,-1,1,1,1,1)  b,#1,(-1,-1,-1,1,1,1)  b,#1,(-1,1,-1,1,1,-1)  b,#1,(-1,-1,-1,1,1,-1)  c,#1,(1,-1,1,-1,1,1)  c,#1,(1,-1,1,-1,-1,1)   a,#11,(9,11,3,9,1,-9)  a,#11,(11,9,3,7,1,-9 ) c,#11,(5,-9,-1,-11,-1,7) c,#11,(5,-9,-1,-11,-1,5) c,#11,(3,-11,-1,-9,1,7) c,#11,(3,-11,-3,-9,1,7) c,#11,(3,-11,-3,-11,-1,7) b,#11,(-1,3,-5,-3,5,-3) b,#11, (-3,3,-7,-3,5,-3)  b,#11,(-3,1,-7,-3,5,-3)  c,#11,(-3,1,-5,-5,5,-1)  a,#11,(3,7,11,-3,9,11 ) a,#11, (3,7,11,-3,9,9) a,#11, (3,7,11,-5,9,11) 
Figure 2:
Excerpt of look-up table giving a pairwise Condorcet extension satisfying participation for n 11 voters (from Theorem 4). Each row lists a weighted tournament as (gR(a, b), gR(a, c), gR(a, d), gR(b, c), gR(b, d), gR(c, d) ) with a chosen alternative, and with the number of voters inducing the tournament.
this setting. To do so, we need to define appropriate notions of participation, and for this we will need to specify agents' preferences over sets of alternatives. Here, we use the optimistic and pessimistic preference extensions. An optimist prefers sets with better most-preferred alternative, while a pessimist prefers sets with better least-preferred alternative. For example, if U = {a, b, d} and V = {b, c}, then an optimist with preferences abcd prefers U to V , while a pessimist prefers V to U . With these notions, we extend the participation property to set-valued voting rules.
A set-valued voting rule F satisfies pessimistic participa-
A set-valued voting rule F is called resolute if it always selects a single alternative, so that for all R we have |F (R)| = 1. A (single-valued) voting rule f is naturally identified with a resolute set-valued voting rule F ; if f satisfies participation, then this F satisfies both optimistic and pessimistic participation. Hence, by Theorem 4, there is a (resolute) set-valued Condorcet extension F that satisfies both optimistic and pessimistic participation. However, there might be hope that allowing voting rules to be irresolute also allows for participation to be attainable for more voters, and indeed this is the case. The SAT solver indicates that no such set-valued voting rule is pairwise. Theorem 5 is optimal in the sense that optimistic participation cannot be achieved if we allow for one more voter. 
Suppose that either a ∈ F (R) or b ∈ F (R). (The case of c ∈ F (R) or d ∈ F (R) is symmetric.) Then let Rα := R+2·abcd. By optimistic participation, we then have either a ∈ F (Rα) or b ∈ F (Rα). If we had a ∈ F (Rα), then also a ∈ F (Rα + 3 · acbd) but this profile has Condorcet winner c, and if b ∈ F (Rα) then also b ∈ F (Rα + 5 · bacd) but this profile has Condorcet winner a. This is a contradiction.
This argument extends to more than 4 alternatives by appealing to a set-valued analogue of Lemma 1.
Inspecting Moulin's original proof [28] shows that it also establishes an impossibility for optimistic participation (for 25 voters). Apparently unaware of this, Jimeno et al. [22] explicitly establish such a result for 27 voters and 5 alternatives. It is worth observing that each step of the proof of Theorem 6 involves adding voters to the current profile, and we never remove voters. In light of Definition 3, this is the reason why the proof establishes a result for optimistic participation. If we restrict ourselves to deleting voters, we obtain a result for pessimistic participation. Proof Sketch. The proof has a similar structure to the proof of Theorem 3, displayed in Figure 1 . The initial profile of this proof is R + 2 · abcd + 2 · dcba, taking R to be the profile of Figure 1 . We further replace proof steps in which voters are added by similar ones where voters are deleted, and invoke pessimistic participation at each such step to obtain a contradiction.
This result strengthens a result of Jimeno et al. [22] , who show that for m 5 no set-valued Condorcet extension satisfying a property called "weak translation invariance" can also satisfy pessimistic participation. Our proof does not need the extra assumption, already works for m = 4 alternatives, and uses just 14 instead of 971 voters.
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As previously observed, adding voters in our impossibility proofs corresponds to optimistic participation, while removing voters corresponds to pessimistic participation. In the proof of Theorem 3, we use both operations, which allows for a tighter bound of just 12 voters. In the set-valued setting, we can formulate this result in a slightly stronger way. Proof. Use the proof of Theorem 3, invoking optimistic participation for edges labelled with the addition of a voter (+), and invoking pessimistic participation for edges labelled with removal of a voter (−). On the other hand, the (singlevalued) voting rule of Theorem 4 clearly satisfies both optimistic and pessimistic participation.
The preference extension combining the optimistic and pessimistic preference extension is also known as the EgliMilner extension.
PROBABILISTIC VOTING RULES
A probabilistic voting rule (also known as a social decision scheme) assigns to each preference profile R a probability distribution (or lottery) over A. Thus, a probabilistic voting rule might assign a fair coin flip between a and b as the outcome of an election.
Formally, let ∆(A) = {p :
x∈A p(x) = 1} be the set of lotteries over A; a lottery p ∈ ∆(A) assigns probability p(x) to alternative x. A probabilistic voting rule f is a function f : R E(N ) → ∆(A). In this context, we say that f is a Condorcet extension if f (R) puts probability 1 on the Condorcet winner of R whenever it exists: if R admits x as the Condorcet winner, then f (R)(x) = 1.
As in the set-valued case, we need a notion of comparing outcomes in order to extend the definition of participation. Here, we use the concept of stochastic dominance (SD). In this case, we write p SD q.
For example, the lottery c is SD-preferred to the lottery c by a voter with preferences abcd. A voter with preferences bacd will feel the other way around. The main appeal of stochastic dominance stems from the following equivalence: p SD q if and only if p yields at least as much von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility as q under any utility function that is consistent with the ordinal preferences . Using this notion of comparing lotteries, we can define participation analogously to the previous settings. Any (single-valued) voting rule f can be seen as a probabilistic voting rule that puts probability 1 on its chosen alternative. If f satisfies participation, then this derived probabilistic voting rule is easily seen to satisfy strong SDparticipation. Hence Theorem 4 gives us a probabilistic Condorcet extension that satisfies strong SD-participation for n 11 voters and m = 4 alternatives.
We now establish a connection between strong SDparticipation and the set-valued notions of participation that we considered in Section 7. This connection will allow us to translate the impossibility results we obtained there to the probabilistic setting. To set up this connection, let us define the support of a lottery p ∈ ∆(A) to be supp(p) := {x ∈ A : p(x) > 0}. Proposition 1. Let f be a probabilistic voting rule satisfying strong SD-participation. Let F = supp •f be the support of f , i.e., F (R) = supp(f (R)) for all profiles R. Then F satisfies both optimistic and pessimistic participation.
Proof. We only verify optimistic participation; the pessimistic case is similar. Let R be a preference profile with electorate N ∈ E(N ), and let i ∈ N \N be a voter with preferences i. Let x = max i F (R), and let U = {y : y i x}. We need to show that max i F (R + i) i x, by finding an alternative y ∈ U that is in the support of f (R + i).
But since f satisfies strong SD-participation, we have Putting these results together with the impossibility result of Theorem 8, we obtain the following. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have given tight results delineating in which situations no-show paradoxes must occur. As such, our results nicely complement recent advances to satisfy Condorcetconsistency and participation by exploiting uncertainties of the voters about their preferences or about the voting rule's tie-breaking mechanism [4, 5, 6] .
Due to unmanageable branching factors when there are 5 alternatives (and hence 5! = 120 possible preference relations), we were unable to check using our approach whether no-show paradoxes occur with even less voters when the number of alternatives grows. It would be interesting to gain a deeper understanding of the computer-generated Condorcet extension that satisfies participation for up to 11 voters. So far, we only know that it (slightly) differs from all Condorcet extensions that are usually considered in the literature. As a first step, it would be desirable to obtain a representation of this rule that is more concise than a lookup table.
Another interesting topic for future research is to find optimal bounds for a variant of the no-show paradox due to Sanver and Zwicker [32] , in which participation is weakened to half-way monotonicity. Their proof requires 702 voters.
